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POLITICAL REFORMS VS. UNDEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN HONG 
KONG 
Cesare M. Scartozzi 
 
 
This essay examines the recent political developments in Hong Kong. Specifically, it examines the problem of 
political accountability and unresponsive governance. The essay argues that lack of accountability is a 
byproduct of existing institutional arrangements – i.e. limited functional franchise, veto powers and 
institutional backdoors – which promote rent-seeking behavior among tycoons and undermine the economic 
freedoms of ordinary Hongkongers, who, dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, demand political 
reforms. 
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Foreign Policy. He acts as editor-in-chief for the academic journal Global Politics Review and he directs the 
Association for Social Sciences, Research and Innovation. His research concerns non-traditional security, 
International Relations theory, risk governance and conflict resolution. He can be contacted via 
www.scartozzi.eu. 
 
Introduction 
Beijing has been able to de-escalate the pro-
democratic demonstrations of 2014 and exacerbate 
the internal divisions among the activists of the 
Umbrella Movement and the moderate silent 
majority of Hongkongers. As a result, social unrest 
has abated, and the majority of protests have gone 
silent. Now that domestic and international 
pressures have eased, Beijing has finally time to 
move from crisis management to crisis resolution, 
ponder the future of the Special Administrative 
Region (SAR), and decide whether to continue in 
the game of repression or start tackling the socio-
political problems that have caused the protests in 
the first place. 
This essay examines the recent political 
developments in Hong Kong. Specifically, it 
examines the issue of political accountability and 
unresponsive governance. The essay argues that 
lack of accountability is a byproduct of existing 
institutional arrangements which promote rent-
seeking behavior among tycoons and undermine the 
economic freedoms of ordinary Hongkongers. 
Moreover, limited functional franchise, veto 
powers, and institutional backdoors continue to 
allow tycoons and pro-Beijing legislators to deter 
any meaningful political reform set to address the 
problem. As a result, socioeconomic inequality has 
been growing among Hongkongers, and it has 
fueled discontent among citizens. Discontent which 
Beijing has been repressing at the cost of increased 
instability in the years to come.  
The underlying argument of this essay has 
important policy implications as it holds that it 
might be in the interest of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) to sack rent-seeking tycoons and 
create an alliance with pro-democratic forces to 
corner Hong Kong separatists. Beijing, as advocated 
in the following pages, should not fear procedural 
accountability, but instead use Hong Kong as a 
playground where to test and learn how to play (and 
even manipulate) the democratic game. If the CPC 
was to guide the foundation of democracy in Hong 
Kong, it could set the rules of the game for the years 
to come and create the much-needed legitimacy and 
support for its rule in the SAR.  
 
Constraints to Political Reforms 
Hong Kong residents enjoy a government tolerant 
of political criticism and substantive freedoms of 
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speech, association, religion, and assembly.1 In 
other words, they are free to voice, exit and, to some 
extent, be disloyal to their government.2 Their 
freedoms are granted by the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong, a proto-democratic constitution that gives 
democratic rights and formalizes the rule of law, 
separation of powers, and procedural elections.3 
However, the Basic Law is also the cause of many 
of the problems that the SAR is facing today 
because the Law also formalizes undemocratic 
institutional arrangements – i.e., limited functional 
franchise, institutional backdoors, and veto powers.4  
The Legislative Council (LegCo) could easily 
reform the Basic Law and remove the undemocratic 
institutional arrangements. But unfortunately, the 
Council is composed of a group of legislators that 
are in power partially because they were able to 
exploit the undemocratic shortcuts offered by the 
Basic Law. Pro-Beijing legislators and tycoons have 
no interest in any meaningful political reforms. 
Unless a pro-democracy majority appears in the 
Council, no changes are to be expected. But clearly, 
such a majority will never appear without a reform 
of the electoral law. As it can be inferred, this is a 
vicious circle that can only be broken by an external 
actor, such as the CPC. However, recent trends have 
shown that also Beijing has no interest in supporting 
pro-democracy legislators. Indeed, the CPC has 
been increasingly assertive in consolidating its 
legislative power at the expenses of LegCo.  
                                   
1 Thomas S. Axworthy and Herman B. Leonard, “The 
Long March in Hong Kong: Continuing Steps in the 
Transition from Colony to Democracy,” KSF Faculty 
Research Working Paper Series, 2006, 2. 
2 For the definitions of “exit, voice, disloyalty”, see: 
Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III, 1st ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
3 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 
(Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China: Constitutional 
and Mainland Affairs Bureau, 2015), chap. IV.; 
Annex I and Annex II. 
4 Kam C. Wong, “Chinese Jurisprudence and Hong Kong 
Law,” China Report 45, no. 3 (2009): 213. 
5 Axworthy and Leonard, “The Long March in Hong 
Kong: Continuing Steps in the Transition from Colony to 
Democracy,” 4. 
The limited functional franchise is the biggest 
obstacle to procedural accountability in Hong 
Kong.5 Article 45 and Article 68 of the Basic Law 
respectively state that, in the long term, universal 
suffrage should be implemented “in accordance 
with the principle of gradual and orderly progress.”6 
To date, this has meant enlarging the suffrage of 
voters, while at the same time keeping close the 
selection of the candidates running for elections.  
The current electoral laws for the Chief Executive 
(CE) and Legislative Council (LegCo) do not abide 
by the principle of one man, one vote. Under the 
Basic Law, the CE is elected by a broadly 
representative Election Committee composed of 
1,200 members and appointed by the Central 
People's Government, while the LegCo consists of 
70 members elected among functional 
constituencies and geographical constituencies.  
The problem is that functional constituencies 
grossly over-represent tycoons and, due to their 
small electorates, are prone to manipulation.7 For 
instance, their electorate is of only about 240,000 
individuals vis-à-vis the geographical 
constituencies’ electorate of 3.47 million voters.8 
Thus, one “functional vote” carries the same weight 
as 14.5 “geographical votes.” In addition, a few 
conglomerates that have businesses in different 
economic sectors can control a large share of 
“corporate voters” within functional constituencies 
since they are represented in multiple 
constituencies.9 Consequently, the current electoral 
6 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 
chap. IV § 1 Art. 45, § 3 Art. 68. 
7 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 
Annex II, Instrument 3 and Instrument 4; Lynn T. White, 
“Hong Kong Is a Modern City Without a Modern 
Government,” Foreign Policy, October 22, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/22/hong-kong-is-a-
modern-city-without-a-modern-government/. 
8 Tanna Chong, “Legco Election 2016: How a Handful of 
Voters Elect 30 Hong Kong Lawmakers,” South China 
Morning Post, February 6, 2014,  
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1421613/legco-election-2016-how-handful-
voters-elect-30-hong-kong-lawmakers. 
9 Eric C. Ip, “The Constitution of Economic Liberty in 
Hong Kong,” Constitutional Political Economy 26, no. 3 
(2015): 317. 
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law distorts the real preferences of the electorate 
and divides the population between those who are 
granted functional representation and those who are 
not.10 
Veto powers add an element of complexity to the 
political reform process. As mentioned before, lack 
of accountability could easily be resolved with an 
amendment of the electoral law, but such 
amendment cannot be done without a widespread 
political will. The LegCo is dived into three groups 
of political actors: pro-Beijing legislators, tycoons’ 
legislators (mostly elected in functional 
constituencies), and democratic legislators.11 Each 
of the three actors has a de facto veto over any 
change of the electoral rule because such 
amendments require a two-thirds majority plus the 
consent of the CE to pass.12 In other words, none of 
the three groups can unilaterally amend the law, and 
inter-party support is necessary for constitutional 
reforms.13  
This vetocracy, as explained by Lynn T. White, 
“prevents the city from solving its problems, which 
include outdated housing, the need to care for an 
aging population, […] oligopolies that fleece Hong 
Kong people, and corruption at the top of the city’s 
government.”14 Veto powers, for example, have 
been used to defeat bills to “open the markets to 
competition in electricity and gas supply in 1998 
and in 1999; to curb fare rises by permitting more 
competition to enter the public transport system in 
2000; and to ease the tax burden on the middle class 
in 2003.”15 The rigidity of the Basic Law was not 
meant to constrain institutional development, but 
                                   
10 Christine Loh, “Functional Constituencies And Hong 
Kong’s Legco Elections,” China Brief, September 1, 
2004, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?t
x_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26799&tx_ttnews%5BbackP
id%5D=194&no_cache=1; Ian Scott, “Functional 
Constituencies and Representation,” in Democracy and 
Political Development (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
Democratic Foundation, 1991), 
http://www.hkdf.org/pr.asp?func=show&pr=121; Loh, 
“Functional Constituencies And Hong Kong’s Legco 
Elections.” 
11 White, “Hong Kong Is a Modern City Without a 
Modern Government.” 
12 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 
Annex 1, Article 7 and Annex 2, Article 3. 
instead to safeguard constitutional principles from 
the tyranny of the majority. However, the rigidity of 
Law has been used by pro-Beijing and Tycoon 
legislators as a mean to maintain the status quo and 
protect the undemocratic institutional arrangements. 
Finally, institutional backdoors are the last nail in 
the coffin of political reforms. Following the 
principle of “one country, two systems”, Hong 
Kong’s government is both accountable to Hong 
Kong residents and to the Central Government in 
Beijing. The Basic Law states in Article 15 that the 
Central People’s Government “shall appoint the 
Chief Executive and the principal officials of the 
executive authorities,”16 and that the Chief 
Executive, accordingly to Article 43, shall be 
accountable to both the Central People’s 
Government and Hong Kong.17  
The relationship between Central and Hong Kong 
governments goes deeper than one of traditional 
principal–agent relationship. Article 158 of Chapter 
VIII of the Basic Law grants the power of 
interpretation of the Basic Law to the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress 
(NPC). Beijing has, therefore, an upper hand when 
it comes to constitutional matters. Even if the 
interpretation power has to be exercised in 
accordance with the other provisions of the Law, 
such as the right of Hong Kong to maintain a high 
degree of autonomy, Beijing has proved to be able 
to tweak the Basic Law to its own advantage. For 
instance, on April 6, 2004, the Standing Committee 
of the Tenth NPC issued an interpretation bill that 
restricted LegCo and empowered Beijing in regards 
13 Vetocracy also subsists for the approval of motions, 
bills or amendments to government bills introduced by 
legislators. In these cases, Annex 2 section 2 of the BL 
requires a simple majority vote for the two functional 
constituencies and geographical constituencies 
separately. Thus, 18 legislators either from a functional 
or geographical constituency are enough to prevent the 
approval of a bill. 
14 White, “Hong Kong Is a Modern City Without a 
Modern Government.” 
15 Ip, “The Constitution of Economic Liberty in Hong 
Kong,” 317. 
16 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 
Art 15. 
17 Ibid. Art. 43. 
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to the amendments procedures for the electoral 
law.18  
The electoral laws for the selection the Chief 
Executive (CE) and LegCo are specified in Annex 
1, Article 7, and Annex 2, Article 3, of the Basic 
Law. This two articles states that “if there is a need 
to amend” the methods for selecting the Chief 
Executives and forming the Legislative Council, 
“such amendments must be made with the 
endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the 
members of the Legislative Council and the consent 
of the Chief Executive and they shall be reported to 
the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress” for approval (in case of amendments of 
Annex 1) and for the record (in case of amendments 
of Annex 2).19  
These articles originally granted the amendment 
initiative to LegCo and limited the NPC to express 
an approval of on the proposed changes to the 
electoral law of the Chief Executive. However, 
everything changed with the interpretation bill of 
2004, which stated that the Standing Committee of 
the NPC is also in charge of determining “if there is 
a need to amend” the articles.20 Thanks to this new 
interpretation of the Law, Beijing was able to 
establish a “new procedural requirement in order to 
democratize Hong Kong's electoral system” by 
which “the Legislative Council is barred from 
acting on election reform until after Beijing has 
given its blessing.”21 Moreover, the NPC also 
interpreted that any amendment of Annex 1, Article 
7, and Annex 2, Article 3, need to be approved or 
                                   
18 Ibid. Instrument 18. 
19 Ibid. Annex 1, Article 7 and Annex 2, Article 3. 
20 Ibid. Instument 18; Bing Ling, “Introduction to the 
Hong Kong Basic Law,” The China Quarterly 221, no. 
March (2015): 229, 237, 
doi:10.1017/S0305741015000144. 
21 Human Rights Watch, “A Question of Patriotism: 
Human Rights and Democratization in Hong Kong,” A 
Human Rights Watch Briefing Papers, 2004, 20. 
22 Phiip Bowring, “How Hong Kong’s Business Elite 
Have Thwarted Democracy for 150 Years,” South China 
Morning Post, October 19, 2014,  
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/1618427/how-hong-kongs-business-elite-
have-thwarted-democracy-150?page=all. 
23 Ip, “The Constitution of Economic Liberty in Hong 
Kong,” 315; Ibid., 320. 
recorded by the Standing Committee of the NPC in 
order to be promulgated. 
The evidence presented in this section suggests that 
limited functional franchise and veto powers allow 
tycoons and pro-Beijing legislators to fully control 
the legislative and executive branches, thus making 
them able to restrict access to institutions. While the 
CPC, which already has the support of pro-Beijing 
legislators, can also use institutional backdoors, 
such as its power to interpret the Basic Law, to 
control and veto constitutional reforms.  
 
Who Benefits from the Status Quo 
With the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, Beijing 
inherited the UK’s undemocratic political order 
where tycoons and colonial institutions were the 
sole groups with access to the city government.22 
When the Basic Law was drafted, the so-called ‘‘big 
capitalists” occupied 12 of the 20 seats reserved for 
Hong Kong residents in the drafting committee and 
they were able to “design institutions to benefit 
themselves in the future.”23 Moreover, with the 
blessing of Beijing, Hong Kong’s tycoons allied 
with pro-China trade unions to establish a 
corporatist regime that would have granted them 
political dominance over the rest of Hong Kong 
residents.24  
After the transition, Beijing continued to franchise 
Hong Kong’s government to the business elite of 
the city.25 This strategy was part of a long-term 
Chinese strategy of “political absorption of 
economics,” set to use Hong Kong government as 
an “absorber” that would have minimized political 
24 Berry F. Hsu, “Judicial Development of Hong Kong on 
the Eve of 1 July 1997,” in The Hong Kong Reader: 
Passage to Chinese Sovereignty, ed. Ming K. Postiglione 
and Gerard A. Chan (Armonk, NY London: M.E. 
Sharpe., 1996), 105–26. 
25 White, “Hong Kong Is a Modern City Without a 
Modern Government.”; Xu Jiatun, the vice-chairman of 
the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee wrote in 
his memoir that Deng Xiaoping interpreted the concept of 
‘Gangren zhi Gang’ as ‘Hong Kong people governing 
Hong Kong’ chiefly under the political leadership of the 
bourgeoisie, and not ‘Hong Kong people governing Hong 
Kong’ chiefly under the political leadership of the 
proletariat. See: Cindy Yik-yi Chu, Chinese Communists 
and Hong Kong Capitalists: 1937-1997 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 69. 
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conflicts “through the granting of special positions 
to the business elite.”26 The strategy, however, 
ignored the will of millions of Hongkongers and 
contributed to foster a political system unresponsive 
to the median voter.  
The governing coalition between Beijing and 
tycoons has lasted until today because it is rooted in 
a series of mutual interests exclusive to Hong 
Kong’s citizens. The two groups used their 
respective institutional powers to reach a two-
pronged goal: Beijing sought control and stability 
while tycoons sought profit. In the mindset of the 
1990s, the two goals of economic development and 
stability were perceived as mutually reinforcing, 
and thus Beijing and the business elites were able to 
coexist in the tiny region of Hong Kong. However, 
is this still the case today? Beijing’s intransigent 
protection of the current status quo reveals that the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) believes it is. Yet, 
macroeconomic trends and figures tell another 
story.  
To date, it seems that economic growth and stability 
are not coexisting anymore in Hong Kong and that 
the interests of Beijing and tycoons are becoming 
mutually exclusive. Tycoons have been using their 
legislative power to protect their oligopolistic 
interests and veto bills that are set to solve public 
problems. Consequentially, they have built an 
exploitive system where: 
 
Wages are taxed, but lightly, while dividends, 
interest, inheritances, and capital gains are 
tax-free. Oligopolies in groceries, 
pharmaceuticals, and property create extra 
"rents" that resemble non-state taxes, paid to 
                                   
26 The strategy was first defined by the local scholar 
Ambrose Y. C. King. Ibid., 47. 
27 White, “Hong Kong Is a Modern City Without a 
Modern Government.” 
28 Shaoguang Wang and Yin Xia, “Growth and Inequality 
in Hong Kong,” in Growth with Inequality: An 
International Comparison on Income Distribution 
(Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 
2012), 23. 
29 Katie Hunt, “Is Hong Kong Really the World’s Freest 
Economy?,” BBC, January 12, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-16501894. 
30 Toby Carrol, “Hong Kong’s pro-Democracy 
Movement Is about Inequality.,” The Guardian, July 28, 
the tycoons who also control Hong Kong’s 
government. Anti-trust laws are condemned 
as state intervention. Welfare is branded 
shameful, even for people who truly need it.27  
 
As a result, even if Hong Kong has enjoyed a period 
of rapid economic growth since the seventies, it 
now “ranks among the most unequal economies.”28 
Despite a GDP per capita of USD 32,000, more than 
half of the population earns less than USD 1,400 a 
month,29 and roughly 1.3 million people (19.6 
percent of the population) are considered to be 
living below the official poverty line.30 From 1971 
to 2011, the Gini coefficient in Hong Kong has 
raised from 0.430 to 0.537, with an upsurge from 
1990 onwards,31 and is now higher than the one of 
US or Singapore.32 The “Hong Kong Quality of Life 
Index” compiled by The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong confirms the trend of increasing 
economic inequality with its seven economic 
indicators registered the lowest score in a decade in 
2012.  
It is particularly fruitful for this study to focus on 
the percentage share that households from different 
income groups have of the total income. It is 
remarkable to observe that from 1966 to 2006: 
 
The income share of the low-income 
households has increased only before 1976. 
After 1976, it can be observed that (1) the 
lower the income group, the greater the 
reduction of its share and (2) the higher the 
decile of income group, the greater the 
realized increase in its share of the total 
income.33  
2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/28/
hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement-is-about-
inequality-the-elite-knows-it. 
31 Wang and Xia, “Growth and Inequality in Hong 
Kong,” 24. 
32 “Beyond The Umbrella Movement: Hong Kong’s 
Struggle With Inequality In 8 Charts,” Forbes, August 
10, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2014/10/08/beyon
d-the-umbrella-revolution-hong-kongs-struggle-with-
inequality-in-8-charts/. 
33 Wang and Xia, “Growth and Inequality in Hong 
Kong,” 24. 
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After more than three decades of this trend, the 
situation has worsened until the point where the first 
decile receives 41.4 percent of total income, while 
the bottom five deciles of households only account 
for 16 percent of the overall income.34  
Redistribution policies have failed to reduce the 
levels income inequality. Shaoguang Wang and Yin 
Xia compared the rate of pre and post redistribution 
of the Gini coefficient in 2006 and found only a 
small reduction of the coefficient, from 0.533 to 
0.475, was due to redistribution.35 In terms of 
market income, the high level of inequality 
registered in Hong Kong is not an anomaly per se. 
But the after redistribution Gini coefficient appears 
to be an anomaly among developed countries. As 
Wang and Xia pointed out in their comparative 
study, Hong Kong is among “the most developed 
economies in terms of its per capita GNP, while it is 
among the worst economies in terms of its 
redistribution ability.”36 
Economic inequality could be reduced with more 
redistribution, welfare, and progressive taxation.37 
However, tycoons have no interest in increasing 
taxes, and they veto any proposals that aim to solve 
the problem. The net result of this impasse is that 
economic inequality is becoming a social issue that 
fuels discontent among citizens against their 
government. Ideally, economic growth could foster 
stability and legitimization for the CPC, but not if 
profits are seized by a kleptocratic elite of 
billionaires whose wealth already equals over 70 
percent of Hong Kong’s annual GDP.38 
Tycoons break the distinction between private and 
public interest, thus transforming Hong Kong into a 
neo-patrimonial state where they govern for private 
gain. Such a state fails to provide the substance of 
what people want from government, it corrodes 
welfare policies, decreases accountability, and 
                                   
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 42. 
36 Ibid., 45. 
37 Chui Lap, Leung Shong Tung, and Chun Hin Yip, 
“Income Inequality In Hong Kong” (Hong Kong 
Statistical Society, 2011), 21. 
38 White, “Hong Kong Is a Modern City Without a 
Modern Government.” 
promotes collusion between government and 
business.39 
The hypothesis of the “collusion” has recently been 
tested and proven valid by Stan Hok-Wui Wong. 
Wong examined firms listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (HKSE) and the membership of 
their shareholders and directors in political 
institutions (the Election Committee). In particular, 
he regressed firm performance (measured by return 
on equity, market-to-book ratio, and earnings per 
share) on Election Committee membership. His 
study concluded that, consistently with the collusion 
hypothesis, “political connection yields positive 
economic payoffs” and “firms experienced an 
improvement in return on equity and market-to-
book ratio after joining the Election Committee.”40 
Overall, the arguments brought up in this section 
shows that the governing coalition between Beijing 
and tycoons has succeeded in fostering economic 
growth, but failed in redistributing the economic 
gains. With collusion and rent-seeking policies 
eroding economic freedoms of citizens and 
preventing meaningful political reforms to take 
place.  
 
Who Wants to Change the Status Quo? 
Hong Kong has a laissez-faire approach to the 
market, which relies on voluntary exchanges and 
sees only a limited participation of the state. This is 
recognized by the Index of Economic Freedom 
published by The Wall Street Journal, which has 
ranked Hong Kong as the ‘‘freest economy of the 
world’’ for more than two decades.41 The perception 
of Hong Kong’s high economic freedom is also 
shared among its residents. Hongkongers appear to 
believe that “the market is a legitimate means of 
distributing income; that everyone should work hard 
to succeed in competition with others; that those 
who work hard should be and would be rewarded; 
39 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political 
Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the 
Globalization of Democracy, e-book (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2014), chap. 1. 
40 Stan Hok-Wui Wong, “Political Connections and Firm 
Performance: The Case of Hong Kong.,” Journal of East 
Asian Studies 10, no. 2 (2010): 300. 
41 Ip, “The Constitution of Economic Liberty in Hong 
Kong,” 321. 
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and that economic failure is mainly an individual’s 
own problem.”42  
At the same time, however, Hongkongers are 
increasingly aware of the effects of socioeconomic 
inequality in society. The Public Opinion 
Programme has collected a series of survey data 
from 1997 to 2015 on residents’ perceptions of 
inequality. The residents were asked whether Hong 
Kong is an egalitarian society, with 10 indicating 
absolutely egalitarian and 0 indicating absolutely 
not egalitarian. The aggregated answer has been 
fluctuating between a 6.52 registered in 1997 and a 
minimum of 5.84 recorded in 2015.43 In addition, 
public awareness of income disparities has been 
persistently high.  
In a survey study made by Timothy K. Y. Wong, 
Po-San Wan and Kenneth W. K. Law, it has been 
shown that the vast majority of the population 
considers income disparities as a serious problem.44 
On average, at least seven out of ten Hongkongers 
rated the inequality as serious or very serious. This 
percentage increased from 58.5 percent in 1995 to 
80.4 percent in 2001.45  
Overall, preferences of Hongkongers are somehow 
contradictory and difficult to explain. On the one 
hand, the problem of income inequality in Hong 
Kong is worse than in many other wealthy societies, 
in both objective and subjective terms.46 On the 
other hand, Hongkongers associate individualism 
with capitalism and prefer limited state intervention. 
The majority of people (75.2 percent), however, 
regards state intervention, as acceptable when it is 
set to provide social welfare.47 Welfare expectations 
are also contradicting. The majority if the 
population support welfare spending and disagree 
                                   
42 Timothy K. Y. Wong, Po-San Wan, and Kenneth W. 
K. Law, “Public Perceptions of Income Inequality in 
Hong Kong: Trends, Causes and Implications,” Journal 
of Contemporary China 18, no. 61 (2009): 670. 
43 HK Public Opinion Programme, “Appraisal of Degree 
of Equality,” accessed December 10, 2015, 
https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/socind/s
ocq51/poll/datatables.html. 
44 Wong, Wan, and Law, “Public Perceptions of Income 
Inequality in Hong Kong: Trends, Causes and 
Implications,” 662. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 271. 
47 Ibid., 662. 
48 Ibid. 
with cutting social welfare. However, at the same 
time, only 16.2 percent supports the introduction of 
new taxes for welfare, and nearly half believe that 
welfare reduces personal incentives to rely on 
themselves.48 
In summary, it appears that Hongkongers hold dear 
their economic freedom and wary state intervention. 
Yet, they are permissive toward intervention for 
welfare policies. As it can be inferred, 
Hongkongers’ preferences are clashing with the 
current state of Hong Kong’s economy as described 
in the previous section. This is because collusion 
and rent-seeking policies erode the economic 
freedom of citizens and state intervention is used 
primarily to the benefit of tycoons.49  
Citizens’ dissatisfaction with the current state of 
affairs has become tangible in an unprecedented 
anti-business sentiment that has arisen in society 
and public discourse.50 Hong Kong media have been 
increasingly condemning collusion between tycoons 
and government, and citizens evaluations of 
tycoons’ legislators have been increasingly 
negative.51 In a survey of 2011, 38.8 percent of the 
interviewee expressed distrust on tycoons’ 
legislators (an increase of 12.5 points since 2006), 
and 54.5 percent stated that tycoons’ legislators are 
profit-oriented and anti-democracy.52  
The role of tycoons in the governing alliance with 
Beijing was to drive economic growth and mediate 
with the local population. Instead, they have kept 
for themselves the dividends of growth and they 
have created cleavages among the population. As a 
result, citizens have opted for disloyalty to put 
pressure upon the governing elite.53 And, at times, 
they succeeded. For example in July 2003, a 
49 Anne O. Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-
Seeking Society,” The American Economic Review 64, 
no. 3 (1974): 302. 
50 Brian C.H. Fong, “State-Society Conflicts under Hong 
Kong’s Hybrid Regime: Governing Coalition Building 
and Civil Society Challenges,” Asian Survey 53, no. 5 
(2013): 872. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Since HK has proto-democratic institutions, the risk of 
being caught are very low because protesting is not 
illegal and demonstrations are usually made within the 
boundaries of the law. Therefore, the variable of risk 
does not influence much the personal incentives in 
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demonstration of 500,000 citizens opposed the 
government’s proposed legislation on internal 
security, which was later withdrawn.54  
However, disloyalty has to date failed to solve the 
fundamental problem of lack of accountability. On 
this particular issue, the governing elite has kept an 
extremely rigid and uncompromising stance, 
because its powers are dependent on the status quo. 
Thus, when citizens mobilized in 2004 
(approximately 200,000 people) and in 2006 
(80,000-200,000 people) to ask for universal 
suffrage, the governing elite was hard-nosed.55 And 
when it finally decided to compromise with a new 
electoral law, it was only able to do so offering a 
fake universal suffrage, which eventually led to the 
massive 2014 protests that involved about 10 to 15 
percent of the voting base.56 
Concluding, it should be pointed out that citizens’ 
protests for fair elections are task-oriented and not 
merely idealistic. Substantial accountability did not 
meet the expectations of the citizens, and therefore 
they asked for procedural accountability. Creating 
an accountable government should be a top priority 
for Beijing as the unaccountable tycoon-led 
government has failed to create stability and 
fostered social unrest. Beijing should prove that it is 
able to adapt to both changing circumstances and 
the rise of new social groups and their political 
demands. If the CPC does not understand or accept 
citizens’ demands, the only way left for the citizens 
to overcome institutional rigidity and political decay 
will be unrest and disobedience.57 Beijing can still 
continue to postpone democratization, but by doing 
so, it will not solve the fundamental problem of 
economic inequality and it will have to cope with 
the population’s latent social unrest. 
The only way Beijing can escape this vicious circle 
is by establishing agency between Hongkongers and 
their government. Once agency is created, citizens 
                                   
participating to a legal protest. Mueller, Public Choice 
III, 227. 
54 Axworthy and Leonard, “The Long March in Hong 
Kong: Continuing Steps in the Transition from Colony to 
Democracy,” 4. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From 
the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of 
Democracy, chap. 36. 
will finally realize that Beijing is not the cause of 
their socioeconomic problems, but instead a 
solution. For the CPC, there is no reason why an 
alliance with citizens would be less beneficial than 
one with the tycoons, a group that has proved to be 
a kleptocratic oligarchy that uses institution and 
resources for private gains at the cost of reduced 
welfare for citizens and reduced stability for 
Beijing.  
An alliance with the citizens would also reduce 
irredentist claims and anti-Chinese sentiments. 
These sentiments should not be overlooked, as a 
recent poll has shown that the number of “young 
people aged 18–29 who claim an exclusively 
Chinese identity has dropped from 20–30 percent a 
decade ago to a mere 4–8 percent today.”58 
It is also important to stress that procedural 
accountability will not lax Beijing rule over Hong 
Kong. Not only Beijing will maintain all the 
institutional backdoors, but its rule over the SAR 
will continue to be guaranteed by Article 18 of the 
Basic Law, which grants extraordinary legislative 
powers to the Central People's Government in the 
case of “turmoil within the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region which endangers national 
unity or security.”59  
 
Conclusion 
Between the “one country” policy advocated by the 
CPC and the “two countries” dream of the Hong 
Kong separatist movement, the “one country, two 
systems” policy still appears to be the optimal 
compromise. Surely, it is a better compromise than 
the “my country, my property” policy backed by 
tycoon legislators. For this reason, Beijing should 
strive to safeguard the “two systems” approach even 
at the cost of granting political reforms.  
If Beijing continues to refrain democratization, it 
will not be able to solve the structural problems that 
58 Ling A. Shiao, “Beijing Is Winning the Battle but 
Losing the War,” East Asia Forum, December 26, 2014, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/12/26/beijing-is-
winning-the-battle-but-losing-the-war/. 
59 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 
Art. 18. 
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have caused social unrest in the first place. 
Containment of democratization will just foster 
political decay and embolden tycoon legislators. 
Conversely, if Beijing decides to proceed with a fair 
amendment the electoral law, it will finally be able 
to remove the undemocratic institutional 
arrangements that have been causing so many 
problems to its rule over the SAR. Lastly, a season 
of political reforms will corner separatist 
movements and weaken the rising anti-Chinese 
sentiment among the youth.  
It seems that Beijing has little to lose and a lot to 
learn from a democratic Hong Kong. Instead of 
seeing democratic institutions as a limit to its own 
power, it should see them as an opportunity to 
consolidate its long-term rule on the SAR. Hong 
Kong, with its proto-democratic institutions and 
strong democratic culture, is the perfect laboratory 
for the CPC to test political reforms without risking 
to undermine its political power at home. Now it is 
the right time to act. 
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